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Studies of homelessness that use city-level observations get systematically differ-
ent results from studies that use individual-level data. I explain why. The findings
are consistent with a model of homelessness as a condition requiring a conjunction
of unfortunate circumstances.
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Two different kinds of empirical cross-section studies of modern American home-
lessness have arrived at apparently contradictory conclusions. Studies that take as their
unit of observation homelessness rates in different cities have generally found that hous-
ing market conditions have large effects, while population composition—the size of the
mentally ill population outside of state psychiatric facilities, for instance, or the or the
extent of poverty–uusally does not. By contrast, studies that take individuals as their
unit of observation find effects for housing market conditions of the cities where the in-
dividuals find themselves, and strong effects for personal personal characteristics. The
two types of studies seem to contrasting policy advice: city-level studies say reduce rents
and increase vacancies, individual-level studies say work on pathology and poverty.
I will argue that the two sets of results are complementary, not contradictory, by
showing a very simple model of homelessness that implies both kinds of results (and also
implies that both varieties of regression are misspecified).
1 LITERATURE REVIEW
Since modern homelessness first rose in the early 1980s, over a dozen published empirical
studies have attempted to determine what factors are responsible for its volume. Early
debates, primarily outside economics, focused on the question of whether “individual
failings”( for instance, mental illness or substance abuse) or “structural problems” (for
instance, high rents) were “responsible” for homelessness (see, e.g., Burt (1992), Jencks
(1994)), but such stark contrasts are no longer so pervasive in the theoretical litera-
ture. The majority of empirical studies of homelessness in economics have used cities
(or counties or metropolitan areas) as their units of observation. These include Tucker
(1989), Quigley (1990), Appelbaum, Dolny, Dreier and Gilderbloom (ADDG) (1991),
Bohannon (1991), Elliott and Krivo (1991), Burt (1992), Filer and Honig (1993), Grimes
and Chressanthis (GC) (1997), Troutman, Jackson, and Ekelund (TJE) (1999), Quigley,
Raphael and Smolensky(QRS) (2001), and Early and Olsen (EO) (2001). Another group
of empirical studies use individuals as their units of observation, and include individuals
in different cities. These studies include Early (1998, 1999) and 1999) and Early and
Olsen (1999). The contrast between these studies is the focus of this paper. (A third set
of empirical studies uses data drawn entirely from within the same city, with same city,
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with variation being supplied by either the cross-section (for example, in Bassuk (1997)
or the time series O’Flaherty (1999)). These within-city studies are not the subject of
this paper.)
Different kinds of variables tend to be important in these two different kinds of stud-
ies. In the city-level studies, researchers generally find that housing market parameters,
broadly understood, determine the volume of homelessness, and that indicators of per-
sonal characteristics have little or no influence. In particular, measures of rent almost
always have significant coefficients in these studies, while measures of poverty almost
always do not. Other housing market variables like vacancy rates, climate, and the
presence of rent control are sometimes significant, while other measures of individual
characteristics like race, gender, drug use, and mental illness are rarely significant.
These results are almost entirely reversed in the studies that use individual-level ob-
servations. Variables like poverty, gender, race, and mental illness are almost always
significant in these regressions, while rents and vacancy rates are never significant. sig-
nificant. Sometimes climate and rent control matter, but not in all studies. A naive
observer who read both kinds of wanted to know whether individual failings or structural
problems were responsible for homelessness would be very confused.
Table 1 below summarizes the results of most of these studies. The studies use
different datasets, different definitions of homelessness, different measures of the variables
of interest, different techniques, and different sets of explanatory variables that are not
reported on. Some of the studies are much more sophisticated and carefully executed than
some of the others. Thus there are many reasons to expect different results. Nevertheless,
the pattern in table 1 is quite strong—personal characteristics matter in individual-level
studies, housing market characteristics matter in city-level studies.
I omitted Tucker (1989) from this table because he employed no personal charac-
teristics and his methods were unorthodox. I also omitted QRS (2001) because it was
difficult to summarize—it involved four different data sets, and several regressions with
each data set. Although QRS used many variables different from those in the other city-
level studies and tested a particular model of the housing market, their results generally
conformed to the results of the other city-level studies. They included measures of the
mentally ill and ex-offender populations that were never significant, while many of their
housing market measures were significant. Compared with other city-level studies, they
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found more significant results about poverty, but their use of poverty-related variables
was in part based on theories about the effect of poverty on the housing market.
TABLE 1: Studies of Homelessness
Personal characteristics Housing market
characteristics
cities Poverty Gender Race Mental h’lth Drugs Rent Vacancy Rent c’tr’l Climate
Quigley -1 0 - - - - ** 0 0 **
ADDG 0 - - - - 0 * 0 **
Burt-2 0 - - - - * 0 - -
Elliott-Krivo 0 - ** ** - ** - - -
Bohanon-3 na - - ** - ** - 0 0
Filer-Honig 0 - * * - ** * - 0
TJE-4 0 - - - * * ** ** 0
GC-4 0 - - 0 - ** - ** 0
EO 2001 0 0 0 0 - ** 0 0 0
individuals
Early 98 ** ** ** ** 0 0 0 - *
Early 99 ** ** 0 ** - 0 0 - *
EO 99 ** ** ** ** 0 0 0 * **
Legend: * = coefficient significant at the 10% level and in the “right” direction.
** = coefficient significant at the 5% level and in the “right” direction.
0 = coefficient insignificant or not in the “right” direction.
- = explanatory variable not included in the study.
Notes:
1. Quigley’s equation II
2. Equation 9-7, best model, all cities.
3. Dependent variable is ln (homeless/poor)
4. 1990 census data
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Early and Olsen (2001) note that one important difference between the individual-
level studies and the city-level studies is in the amount of variation they allow the econo-
metrician to observe. Individual-level studies provide a great deal of variation in personal
characteristics, and so allow the coefficients of those variables to be estimated very pre-
cisely, but they do not allow a great deal of variation in housing market characteristics.
City-level studies are the reverse. I do not dispute this explanation, or deny that it has
some relevance. The difference between individual-level studies and studies, however, is
much more fundamental than a difference in precision of estimates, which would disap-
pear in infinitely large samples. I argue below that even with infinitely large samples,
the two types of studies will give different estimates.
2 A MODEL
Consider a set of cities i− 1, ...C,each with population n (this mitigates weighting prob-
lems). Each individual j in city i is either at risk of homelessness or not. “Risk of
homelessness” depends on such individual-level characteristics as mental illness, poverty,
substance abuse, maleness, minority status, weak family ties, tastes for independence,
skills in living outdoors, living outdoors, and so on. We assume that “risk of homeless-
ness” is a binary variable (either you are at risk of or you are not), perfectly observable to
the econometrician, and denote mij = 1 if person j in city i is at risk; mij = 0 otherwise.
Write mi =
∑
j mij as the size of the at-risk population in city i.
We model the housing market in each city even more simply. There are a fixed and
immutable number of houses (n−Hi) in city city i. We also assume that Hi is perfectly
observable to the econometrician (who may have to use rent, vacancy, climate, and rent
control variables in order to observe
Homelessness arises when at-risk individuals cannot find places to live.Specifically,
there are two types of cities: those in which the housing shortfall is smaller than the
at-risk population; and those in which it is larger. The former we call “housing-rich”
cities, the latter we call “housing-short” cities. We denote the set of housing-rich cities
as R
R = {ibmi ≥ Hi}
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and the set of housing-short cities as S
S = {ibmi ≤ Hi}
People who are not at-risk never become homeless.
In housing-rich cities, the number of at-risk people who become homeless is Hi. At-
risk people are at the end of the queue for housing, and the housing supply runs out
before they can all be accommodated, but after some of them are accommodated. In
housing-short cities, all at-risk people are homeless, but people who are not at-risk find
some other way of coping with the housing shortage: they double-up with relatives, pay
for illegal subletting and subdivision, take long vacations, move into hotels, and so on.
(Alternatively, you can think of (n−Hi) as the immutable number of affordable houses;
then people who are not at risk live in houses that are not affordable in cities in housing
shortage.)
Let hij = 1 if person j in city i is homeless; hij = 0 otherwise, and
∑
j hij = hi. Then
on a city level we have
(1)
hi = min[Hi,mi]
= Hi i ∈ R
= mi i ∈ S.
On an individual level we have
Pr(hij = 1) = 0 if mij = 0
= Hi/mi if i ∈ Randmij = 1
= 1 if i ∈ Sandmij = 1
or
(2)
Pr(hij = 1) = mij min(Hi/mi, 1).
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Like all models, this one is a gross over-simplification. The key assumption is
that being homeless is not just a matter of being either the wrong kind of person or
in the wrong kind of place; rather, it depends on being both the wrong kind of person
and in the wrong kind of place. Elsewhere (1995), for instance, I have developed a
much more detailed model of homelessness, and Park (1997) has developed a model that
includes both homelessness and positive vacancy rates. Those models can be understood
as elaborate discussions of what determines Hi in Hi in each city. In the appendix, I
show a simple equilibrium model with optimizing behavior in which (1) and (2)
3 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
Equations (1) and (2) describe homelessness on a city level and on an individual level,
respectively, under our model, but these are not the equations that have been estimated
in the literature. In this section, we study simplified versions of the equations that have
actually been estimated. We show that the estimates derived from these equations tell
us little about homelessness, but much about the relationship between mi and Hi, about
which most people have no intuition or a great deal of interest (other than learning which
is smaller in a particular city). We also show that the apparently divergent results of
the city-level and individual-level estimations can be reconciled with our model and the
additional premise that most cities are in set S.
For tractability, we confine our attention to OLS estimates.
A. City-Level Estimates
The usual equation estimated in studies with city-level observations can be thought
of as





where the last term are i.i.d. mean zero errors. We omit an intercept in the belief
that a city without either at-risk individuals or any kind of housing shortage would have
no homelessness.
To understand the estimates for (3), it is helpful to think about two auxiliary
regressions. These are the two linear relationships between mi and Hi :
7








Assume we have estimated these two equations by OLS, obtaining coefficient estimates
B̂m and B̂H and residuals (emi ) and (e
H
i ) in the process. It is easy to show that both
coefficient estimates will be positive, and that B̂mB̂H ≤ 1, with equality only if mi and
Hi are perfectly correlated, which we rule out for simplicity.



















where summations without arguments are over the entire set of cities. It is easy to
prove that both coefficient estimates are nonnegative. Either coefficient estimate may be
greater than one, although this is unlikely, and we can prove that at most one of them is
greater than one:
Proposition 1: It is impossible for both α̂c Â 1 and β̂c Â 1.
Proof of proposition 1: Suppose α̂c Â 1.
We will show β̂c ≺ 1. Since (1− B̂mB̂H) ≺ 1, α̂c Â 1 implies that the sum over R,∑
R
(mi −Hi)emi ≺ 0.
Since(mi−Hi) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ R, this can happen only if emi ≺ 0 for some city in R. Since
emi = mi − B̂mHi
and
mi −Hi ≥ 0
we see that emi ≺ 0 is for some i is possible only if B̂m > 1. This implies B̂H < 1. Since
B̂H < 1,
eHi = Hi − B̂Hmi > Hi −mi > 0
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for all i ∈ S. Hence the summation over S,∑
S
(Hi −mi)eHi > 0.
From (6), this implies β̂c < 1.
Similar reasoning leads to the conclusion that β̂c > 1 implies α̂c < 1.QED
To understand (6), first think about what happens if the set S is empty: if









all that matters in determining homelessness rates in a city are housing market conditions.
Homelessness in each city is constrained not by the supply of individuals at risk, but by
the size of the housing shortfall.









all that matters in determining homelessness are population characteristics. Homelessness
is constrained by the supply of at-risk individuals, not the housing shortfall.
In general, then, (6) shows that if most cities are in set R, and the difference (mi−Hi)
is great, then the coefficient on housing market characteristics will be large and the
coefficient on population characteristics will be small. Since most studies of this type
reach this conclusion, what they are telling us is that most cities are in set R.
Such a conclusion does not strain intuition. Most estimates on the national level of
the number of severely mentally ill people, the number of substance abusers, the number
of extremely poor people, the number of male individuals, and the number of members
of racial minority groups all place their numbers well in excess of the number of homeless
people. We should not be surprised if the same were true for the most part on the local
level as well. Alternatively, if we interpret people who have actually been homeless at
any time in the past several years as having the individual characteristics that place
them at risk of homelessness, then the standard results about turnover also imply that
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the number of people at-risk is substantially greater than the homeless population at any
moment.
B. Individual-Level Estimates
The usual equation estimated in studies with individual-level observations can be
thought of as





where the last term are i.i.d. mean zero errors.
As with the city-level estimates, understanding these estimates is helped by fo-
cussing first on three auxiliary equations:
(8) Hi
mi
= AR +BRHi + E
R
i i ∈ R
(9) 1 = AS +BSHi + E
S
i i ∈ S
(10) hi
mi
= A+BHi + Eii ∈ R ^ S
where (10) is clearly the pooled version of (8) and (9).
Starting with the unpooled equations is more convenient. We estimate all these
equations by weighted least squares, with the weight on each city being the square root
of its at-risk population.










In set S, the rate of homelessness among the at-risk population is independent of the
housing market; all at-risk people are homeless.
Equation (8) is considerably more complex. It has no obvious solution, and I am
aware of no theory that predicts values for the coefficients. Two simple atheoretical
stories give opposite predictions: if the same proportion ρ of at-risk people are homeless


































































where all summations are over the set R.
Usually, since (Hi/mi) is positive and less than one in set R, while Hi is a large
positive number (considerably greater than one, that is), you would expect that AR > 0
and BR < 1, but this result is difficult to prove with complete generality. We can prove
two somewhat weaker propositions: namely, that if population characteristics matter at
all, then the coefficient on housing markets is very small; and that if the sample includes
enough people at risk, then the coefficient on housing markets is less than one. This is
important because for cities in R, in city-level regressions the coefficient on the housing
market is always one.
Proposition 2: If AR ≥ 0, then BR < 1
HR
, where HR is the weighted average of Hi in
set R.
Proof: Let over-bars denote weighted means in R. Since a regression line goes through
















since (Hi/mi) is less than one in set R.QED
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Proposition 3: Let µ denote the smallest mi in R. If µ is sufficiently large, then
BR < 1.










miHR(Hi −HR) = Z,
is positive, Z is positive.
Let R1 denote the subset of R where Hi ≥ HR and R2 its complement. Let
Zk, k = 1, 2 denote the corresponding partial sums, where Z1 > 0, Z2 < 0, Z1 + Z2 = Z.
Thus
Z1
| Z2 | > 1.
Let m1 denote the smallest value of mi in R1 and m2 denote the largest value of mi












Hi(Hi −HR)(mi − 1) m1
m1 − 1 = X1
m1













Hi(Hi −HR)(mi − 1) m2
m2 − 1 = X2
m2
m2 − 1 .
Combining these we obtain
Z1



















| Z2 | <
X1
| X2 | .
Thus for any Zk, k = 1, 2, for µ sufficiently large, X1 >| X2 | .


















Thus BR < 1.QED.
Now consider equation (10), which is the same as equations (8) and (9) except that the
two sets of cities are pooled. Let (Ax, Bx) denote the intercept and the slope respectively











The numerator of Bx is positive, but the signs of the other terms are indeterminate.
If HS − HR > 0, then Bx > 0, Ax < 1;in the opposite case, Bx < 0, Ax > 1. Most
importantly, as long as either HS − HR > 1 or HS − HR < 0, we have Bx < 1. With
large numbers, one or the other of these cases is virtually certain.
The slope of the pooled equation (10) is a weighted average of the slopes of the two
sets, BR and BS, and the slope “between the sets,” Bx. The weights are proportional
to contributions to total (weighted) variance in Hi of the two sets and the difference



























Since BS = 0, and for large populations, BR < 1, Bx < 1, we have for large populations,
B < 1. In general, most extant theories say nothing about (A,B).


























where summations without arguments are over all cities.
Having examined the auxiliary equations, we turn to (7), the individual-level equation
























Comparing this expression with (12), we see that the only difference is in the lower right
corner of the first matrix. In (13), this is
∑











with strict inequality if at least one person is not at risk of homelessness.
The intuition behind this correspondence is that the weighted city-level equation
(10) recovers the same coefficients as the individual-level equation (7) with the sample
restricted to the at-risk population (with the intercept in (10) being the coefficient on
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at-risk status in restricted (7)). The dependent variable in (10) is the probability of being
homeless if you are at risk; the independent variable is the housing gap. The same is
true for equation (7) restricted to the at-risk population. Unrestricted equation (7) just
adds in the population that is not at risk, but none of this population is homeless.
Thus, since the lower right component of the first matrix affects only the denominator
in the expression for β̂I , we see unambiguously that
| β̂I |<| B |
with the extent of the difference being greater the greater the number of not-at-risk
people in the sample (weighted by H2i ). Since in the large sample case, B < 1,
β̂I < 1
even if all cities are in R (and provided that B º 0 if some cities are not in R).
The reason for the attenuation of housing market effects in the unrestricted sample
is also simple to understand. The housing market has no effect on people who are not at
risk; they are never homeless. Thus pooling the at-risk population with the population
not at risk reduces the average effect of the housing market.
As for the coefficient α̂I of individual characteristics, the sign of the difference with
A is ambiguous, since the lower right component enters into both the numerator and
the denominator. If no cities are in set S (which makes the coefficient on population
characteristics disappear in the city-level regressions), α̂I may still be positive, since if
(Hi/mi) is approximately constant in set R, A
R = A will be positive. Since both the
numerator and the denominator of α̂I are bigger than the numerator and the denominator
respectively of A, if A = AR is positive, α̂I will be positive, too.
4 CONCLUSION
Thus the results in the literature–with individual-level observations, personal character-
istics matter and housing markets don’t; the opposite with city-level observations–are
consistent with a world in the simple-minded theoretical model holds, most cities are in
set R, and in those cities the housing gap is roughly proportional to the size of the at-risk
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population.
This is not, however, the major conclusion I wish to draw from this exercise. Rather,
the major conclusion for researchers is that they should think more carefully about the
interaction between individual and market characteristics, and not just let the sets of
variables “fight it out for themselves.” For policy, the conclusion is similar: interaction
matters.
The obvious question for future research is whether other phenomena, not just home-
lessness, work in this fashion. I suspect that they do. Consider child abuse, for instance.
Paxson and Waldfogel (1999a, 1999b, 2000) use state level data and find that higher
AFDC benefits and lower unemployment rates reduce child abuse, but Berger (2002),
using individual data, is unable to replicate the strong relationships that Paxson and
Waldfogel found. It is possible to think of child abuse occurring only when a conjunc-
tion of unfortunate circumstances occurs–when parents somehow predisposed to abusing
their children find themselves operating in an an environment where child abuse is not
sufficiently discouraged. The need for a conjunction is what drove the theoretical results
in section 2, and so child abuse may be like homelessness in this respect.
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APPENDIX: A SIMPLE EQUILIBRIUMMODEL OF HOME-
LESSNESS IN A CITY
Consider a city with n people, of whom m suffer from pathologies. All have
identical income, which we normalize to unity, and have identical utility functions if
housed. Specifically, if housed, an individual’s utility depends on the the quantity k of
housing consumed and the quantity x of a numeraire non-housing good:
u(k, x) = ln x+ ln k,
s.t, rk + x ≤ 1,
where r is the price of housing. The utility of an individual who is not housed but
consumes x of the non-housing good is
lnC + ln x,
where C = c > 0 if the individual suffers from pathologies, and C = 0 otherwise. Thus
those who do not suffer from pathologies are never homeless. The value of c may depend
on climate, for instance, or shelter provision (if the latter is considered exogenous).
Let R denote the value of rent at which individuals who suffer from pathology are










, if r < R




, if r > R.
We take the supply of housing S(r) as a linear function of the price of housing:
S(r) = sr, s > 0.
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The supply parameter s may vary from city to city, with institutions and geography.
In this model there are equilibria with no homelessness, and two kinds of equilibria
with homelessness. We ignore the equilibria with no homelessness.
In one kind of equilibria with homelessness,
r = R,
and some individuals with pathologies are homeless but not all. The demand curve has a
flat plateau, and these equilibria occur when the supply curve cuts the demand curve on
this plateau. The quantity of housing required to house all the people who are homeless
in an equilibrium like this is
sR− 2nc
and each housed person consumes
1
2R












Notice that H depends only on housing market variables–the variablem does not appear–
and is positively correlated with the observed rent R. The necessary condition for an
equilibrium of this type to obtain is that the intersection of demand and supply be on
the flat plateau, or
H ≤ m.
Cities with this type of equilibrium would be called housing-rich in the text.
In the other kind of equilibria with homelessness, the demand curve intersects the
supply curve to the left of and above the flat plateau. Equilibrium rent is above R,
and as a result, all individuals with pathologies are homeless. Homelessness is simply the
number of individuals with pathologies, and does not respond to small changes in housing
market variables. Cities with this type of equilibrium would be called housing-short in
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the text. Thus, for instance, the difference between housing-rich and housing-short cities
could lie in the steepness of the supply curve, with housing-rich cities having a more
elastic supply of housing.
Thus the volume of homelessness in this very simple equilibrium model is described by
(1) in the text. Thus (1) does not depend on the existence of irrational or non-equilibrium
behavior.
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